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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000039

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD, PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014

TAGS: PARM PREL LY CWC

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): OPCW REQUESTS
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA

REF: THE HAGUE 32

Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B, D)

This is CWC-4-04.

¶1. (C) Summary: Brian Hawtin, acting Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, made a strong pitch for close cooperation with the U.S. and UK in ongoing discussions to address Libya's CW program. He concurred on the need to keep the focus on the larger goal of ensuring Libya's program is eliminated, and avoiding a bureaucratic exercise which impeded progress toward that goal. While the total impact on OPCW resources is not yet clear, Hawtin commented that verification and inspection requirements concerning Libya may force a reassessment of other current obligations. End Summary.

¶2. (C) In a Jan. 6 conversation which occurred at about the time Libya formally requested OPCW technical assistance in order to accede to the CW Convention (reftel), Hawtin emphasized the importance of staying in close contact with the U.S. and U.K. with regard to Libya. He added that this was clearly the view of DG Pfirter, who would return to the office on January 19. Hawtin requested a meeting soon with Ambassador Javits and U.K. Ambassador Budd to ensure that all parties are working in unison.

¶3. (C) We told Hawtin that we agreed on the importance of close and continuing dialogue. We also stressed the point that the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) must not lose sight of the bigger picture regarding Libyan activities as it pursues the requirements under the Convention and established by the TS. We need to avoid a situation where the focus on technical requirements impedes, rather than promotes, transparency and full disclosure, as had sometimes occurred in our dealings with the Russians on their CW programs. Hawtin fully agreed and said this reinforced the need for early and complete discussions between the U.S., U.K. and TS to ensure we gave a consistent message to the Libyans. He stressed that it would be important to ensure that appropriate briefings from Washington and London be provided to those members of the TS who would travel to Libya so they could do their job properly.

¶4. (C) There was agreement on the assumption the DG would want to make a trip to Libya as soon as appropriate, and Pfirter would take his cue from how U.S./UK discussions with the Libyans would develop. Hawtin then requested that he be kept apprised on the developments concerning the formal Libyan steps to inform the UN of its intention to accede to the Convention.

¶5. (C) We asked Hawtin whether the responsibilities involving Libya would generate a budgetary problem in the coming year. Hawtin began by noting that Horst Reeps, the Director of the Verification Division, had already made the point that it would be necessary to put the tenure decision on hold (at least with regard to his division) due to Libya. Hawtin's only comment was that while he did not think that a freeze on tenure was possible, there may be a reason to take a hard look at how many inspectors should be separated from service in 2004. Hawtin shared Reeps' view that, depending on what has to be done in Libya, there will be a requirement to assess whether other verification and inspection activities should be cut so that Libya can be squeezed in. In that regard, Hawtin made a strong pitch for immediate implementation of the arrangement for "on-call inspectors," as well as further work on more effective verification procedures that would reduce costs.

¶6. (C) At this point, Hawtin commented, there is no way to know whether any kind of supplemental budget or request for voluntary contributions would be required. Emphasizing that the actual destruction of Libyan stocks would not be an OPCW responsibility (the arrangement under the CWC is that the possessor states pay for destruction), the open questions

involve verification and inspection requirements for production, storage and destruction facilities. In that regard, Hawtin said there was particular interest on where the U.S. and UK might want the Libyans to come out on the issue of storage facilities.

17. (C) Regarding destruction costs, Hawtin provided a suggestion, stating that a member of EU HIREP Solana's staff had contacted the TS to emphasize the EU's interest in contributing to elimination of Libya's WMD programs. While not making any promises, it was clear that there was a particular interest conveyed by Solana's staffer in having the EU become involved in these important developments, and Hawtin suggested the U.S. and/or UK may want to see whether the EU would be willing to make a contribution.

18. (C) Hawtin noted that while the Verification Branch obviously has the lead in working the immediate steps to be taken, he had asked External Relations chief Huang Yu to focus on what efforts his division would need to make to address the impact the Libyan decision would have on other countries in the region, as well as on the larger efforts to promote states that are not party to the CWC to accede to the Convention. Hawtin added that he has also tasked the Public Relations office to see how the OPCW's work on Libya would complement the effort to highlight overall OPCW activities covering a wide variety of fields. Hawtin stressed that he would obviously appreciate as much assistance and advice as possible from the U.S. in these areas.

19. (U) Ito sends.
RUSSEL